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1 Introduction 
The building of an intdligent agent has become the main concern of Artilicial lntelligence (Al) l5J. 
Unrorlunalcly, this enterprise proved to be unattainable, in particular given the complcxity involved 
with the fOlmal definition of intclligence. To overcome this problem, several researchers suggested thc 
notion of ralioflal agents as a substitute for the notion of intelligent agent L14, 15, 11 J. Consequcntly. 
mainstrcam Al nowadays strives for dclining what a rational agent is. 
Although consensus about the properties mcct by rational agents is hardly evcr reach, wc can single 
out sorne fcatures that secm recurrellt: 
l. Knowledge representation. 
2. Reasoning capabilities. 
3. Proactivity. 
4. Autonomy. 
5. Interaction. 
An agent naturally requircs a way of reprcsenting its knowlcdge and also an inferential apparaLus to 
condude from it; this accounts for properLies 1 and 2. Proactivity, the ability of an agent to Lriggcr sorne 
activity by its own, is considered essential in several agent delillitions. The next property, autonomy, 
segregates those entities with a ccnt.ralizcd control that we are not interested in considcring as agents. 
Finally, thc characterization of a solipsistic agent is certainly of no use. The atlractive domains 1'01 
agent-based applications are precisely those that revolves around agent interaction. 
Note that by combining autonomy with interaction we hopcIessly run into conJlicts. Thcse contlicLs 
arise from the diffel'cnt world views cntailed by autonomy, c1ashed against one anothcr by intcraction. 
However, the agents with conflicting positions can start a negotialion in ol'dcr to come to a mutual 
agreement (ir they intend to). As a consequence, one might think that ncgotiation plays a kcy role in 
lhe multi-agent system development. Despite of this, it has bcell lal'gely put asidc in Al, perhaps givcn 
Lhe complcxiLy of defining jusI ofle rational agent. 
The traditiollal approach fol' modelillg multi-agent negotiation resorts to game thcory l13 J. Even 
lhough several illsightful issues have been explol'ed undel' this concepLioll, it dcpcnds on Lhe strong 
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assumption that cach agent is aware of the complete pay-olT matrix (i.e., they know their prcferenccs 
and also the preferences of their eounterparls) before the negotiation begins. Clcarly, this assumption 
restrains game-theoretk based negotiation from being applicable in real world sccnarios. 
In this paper we endorse the ailernative approach that negotiation can be seen as an argumen-
tative process. Recent progress in defeasible argumentation favors dialectical charactel'Ízatiuns (e.y., 
Prakken's dialogue game [12], Simari's dialcctical U'ees [16]). Under this view, two parties take oppos-
ing positions regarding a eerlain matter, and altematively pose reasons baeking their slances. Nolably. 
the similarity with ncgotiation is striking. In the next section wc dclve jnto this similarily. Laler, 
section 3 highlights the rclated work in lhe ficld, and finally section 4 states our conclusions, 
2 Negotiation as dialectical argumentation 
Defeasible Logic Progl'llfllming is an exlension 01' lraditional logic programming that is expressivc 
enollgh to represent incomplete and polentially contradictory infOlmation l31. This expressi veness 
is obtained by applying ideas from defeasible argumelltatioft in order to decide belween contlicling 
goals [17]. In this fOlmalism, an argument represenls a defcasible reason for a certain conclusion. In 
turn, a concIusion q is said to be justified only when it is supportcd by a juslitied (i.e., non-uel'ealed) 
argument A. In order tu establish whether A is a non-defeated argument, the system looks fol' cOllnter-
arguments that eould be defealel's ror A. Since defeaters are also arguments, lhere may exist dcfealel's 
1'01' the defeaters, and so on, lhus requiring a complele I'ecw'sive analysis. This recw'sive analysis is 
structured in this framework as a dialeclical lree, whose fom1al definitiOJI follows. 
Definition 2.1 Let A be an argument fOl' q. A dialectical free fOl' (A, q), denotcd 1(A,I/)' is rewrsive1y 
detined as follows: 
l. A single node labeled with an argllment (A, q) wilh no dcfealers is by itself the dialedical U'ee 
for (A, q). 
2. Let (Al, ql), ... , (An, q,n) be alI the defeaters for (A, q). We consU'uct the dialectical tree 1'01' 
(A, q), 7(A, q)' by labeling the root node with (A, q) and by making this node the parent node 
01' the roots of the dialectical trees for (A., ql), ... , (An , qn). • 
Note that a dialectical tree encompasses an the arguments that can affect the status of the argumenl 
placcd at its rool. Consequently, given a dialectical tree {A,q)' it is easy to establish whether A is a 
non-defeated argumcnt for q (see [4] for the algorilhm). 
As shown in [181, any dialectical tree can eITortlessly be rccasted inlo a dispute beLweell two 
opposing parties. On Ihe one hand, there is a pmponent who tries to back the concIusion supported 
by the argument in root 01' the dialectical lree. Simply pUL, lhe proponent. provides the argumenls in 
the odd levels of the dialectical tree. 011 the other hand, there is an oppoflent who U'ies to defeat any 
argument given by the proponent. Likewise. the opponent accounts 1'01' the arguments in the even levels 
of the dialectical tree. This is the pmticular view that has allowed us to consider the detinition 01' a 
negotiation protocol based upon dialectical argumentation as feasiblc. 
3 Related Work 
Given the space restrictions, we focus ollr discussion on the related work thal address negotialion froDl 
an a.rgumentation-based perspecli ve. 
Parsons et al. have devcloped over a series of papers [9, IOJ the idea that negotiation can indeed be 
seen as an m'gumentative process. Unfortunately, they have adopted a rather simplislic argumentatioll 
system [8] as the foundation of their negotiation protocol. For instance, this argumentation systenl 
lthe missing dcl1nitions for SO[llI! of the prclirninary notions can be found in [17, 16,4J. 
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laeks reinstatement, an atl..ractive property present in many argumentative frameworks 12,1,17,4, IIJ. 
In faet, our work was initially motivated by the limitations identified in this approaeh. 
Aecording lo Kraus el al. [7], the work by Parsons el al. allegedly foIlows from their previous 
results in [6]. Therefore, Kraus et al. shares our position regarding agent negoliation, albeit they adopt 
a multi-modal logic as lhe representation for the agent knowledge. We believe that in doing this, they 
have to neglect implemcntability somewhere as a consequence of the (widely acknowlcdged) lenuous 
link betwecn theoretical work in modal logics and thcir applications. In contrast, our work attempts to 
preserve both expressi vcncss and implcmcntability. 
4 Conclusions 
We 1i11Tlly endorsel following what we have arguedl that negotiation among rational agents clearly 
resembles a dialcctical analysis like the present in almost every fOlmalization of defeasible argumenta-
tion. Thercfore, the same methods and techniques devcIoped for lhis type 01' analysis can be adoptcd 
as a guidance to tackle multi-agent negoliation. 
Moreovcr, this approach is being undertaken as lhe lirsl allthor' s Master Thcsis (recent progress on 
this sllbject can be found al http://cs.uns.edu.ar/giia.html). 
References 
lIJ Bondarenko, A, Dung, P. M., Kowalski, R. A, and Toni, F. An Absu'acl, Argumenlation-
Theoretic Approal:h lo Default Reasoning. Artificial Intelligence 93, l{ 2 (1997), 63[10 1. 
[2J Dung, P. M. On the Aeeeptability of Arguments and its Fundamental Role in Nonmonolonie 
Reasoning and Logic Programming and n-Person Garnes. Artificial Intelligenc'e 77, 2 (1995), 
32l{357. 
l3J Ga.re a, A J. La Programaci n en L gica Rebatible: su definici n te rica y computacional. 
Master's thesis, Departamento de Ciencias de la Computaci n, Universidad Nacional del Sur, 
Bah a Blanca, Argentina, June 1997. 
l4J Garc a, A J., Simari, G. R., and Chesaevar, C. 1. An Argull1entative Framework for Rcasoning 
wilh lnconsistent and lncomplete InfOlmation. In Pmceedings oI the Workshop (lit Practical 
Reasoning and Rationality (Brighton, United Kingdom, Aug. 1998), 13th European Conferencc 
on Artificial lntelligence, pp. 13[19. 
l5J Ginsberg, M, Esst'ntials of Artijiciallntelligence. Morgan Kaufmann Publishers, 1993. 
[61 Kraus, S., Nirkhe, M., and Sycara, K. Reaching Agreements Through Argumentation: A Logical 
Model (A Preliminary Report). In Proreediflgs oI the 12th Inlernalioflal Works!top on [)istribllfed 
Artificial Intelligence (1993), pp. 233 {247. 
17J Kraus, S., Sycara. K., and Evenchik. A. Reaching Agreements through Argllmentation: A Logica1 
Model and Implcmentation. Artijiciallnlelligence 104, I {2 (1998), l{ 69. 
l8J Krause, P., Ambler, S., Elvang-Gt ransson, M., and Fox, J. A logic 01' argumentation 1'or reasoning 
under uncertainty. Computational Intelligence 11, 1 (1995), 113 { 131. 
[9] Parsons, S., and Jennings, N. Negotiation through argumentationl a preliminary report. In Pro-
ceedings oJ 2nd Intemational Conjerence on Multi-Agefll Systems (Kyoto, Japan, 1996), pp. 267[ 
274. 
llOJ Parsons, S .. Sierra, c., and Jennings, N. Agcnts that Reason and Ncgotiatc by Arguing. ¡oumal 
of Logic ami Computation 8, 3 (1998), 261[292. 
Wicc 2000 - 24 
r llj Pollock, J. L. Cognitive Carperltly: a blueprint for how to build a persono MIT Press, ) 995. 
L12j Prakkcn, H. Logical Tools for Modelling Legal Argument. Kluwer Acadcmic Publishers. 1997. 
[13 j Rosenschcin, l, and Zlotkin, G. Rules of Encounter: Designing Conventions fo,. Automated 
Negotiation among Computers. Artificial Intelligencc Sedes. MIT Press, 1994. 
[14] Russell, S. Rationality and Intelligencc. Artifidallntelligence 94, 1{2 (1997), 57{77. 
[15] Russell, S., and Norvig, P. A,.tifidallntelligence: A Modem Approach. Prenticc Hall, 1995. 
116] Simari, G. R., ChesaJ!var, C. l., and Garc a, A. J. The Role of Dialectics in Defeasiblc Argumenta-
tion. In Proceedings of tite XlV Conferencia Internacional de la Sociedad Chilena para Ciencias 
de la Compu.tad ti (Concepci n, Chile, Nov. 1994), Universidad de Concepci n. pp. 111 { 121. 
L 17] Simad, G. R.. anJ Loui, R. P. A Mathematical Trcatment of Defeasible Reasoning and its 
Implementation. Artificiallntelligence 53, 1{2 (1992), l25{ 157. 
llSI Stankevicius, A. G., and Gare a, A. J. Modelling Negotiation Protocols in a Dialeetical Frame-
work. In Proceedings of the 6th Works!top on Aspectos le ricos de la Inteligencia Artificial, 1st 
Workshop of Investigadores en Ciencias de la Computad n (San Juan, May 1999), Universidad 
Nacional de San Juan, pp. 69{76. 
Wicc 2000 - 25 
